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
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I. Introduction  
Traditional economic analysis of accident law has largely focused on individual utility 
maximizing actors as potential injurers and potential victims. On that basis a huge literature 
has been developed since the early publications of Calabresi in the 1960s
1
 explaining under 
which conditions particular liability rules may be effective in promoting social welfare.
2
 
Moreover, the theoretical assumptions made in the literature have increasingly been met with 
empirical support as well.
3
 However, less attention was paid to the situation where the 
tortfeasor would not be an individual actor or commercial enterprise, but a public authority or 
the state. Only during the recent years a few articles exploring public authority liability have 
been published, some of them focusing specifically on the liability of the state in public 
international law, asking e.g. to what extent states have incentives to comply with 
international conventions and more recently also applying economic analysis to the case 
where a public authority would be a tortfeasor in a more ordinary (domestic) tort case. 
However, the literature is still relatively recent and has perhaps not produced that clear 
conclusions as in the case of economic analysis of accidents generally. The goal of our 
contribution is to provide some insights on this literature and of course, where possible, to 
deepen and elaborate on this literature. This may be helpful since to some extent the literature 
may have a rather abstract character and may thus be less linked to specific problems that 
lawyers are dealing with when referring to public authority liability.  
Our contribution is inevitably limited to an economic analysis and will hence not focus on 
legal issues which will be the core subject of other contributions to this volume. However, to 
some extent the economic literature also provides examples from various jurisdictions (often 
the US). These examples (and cases) will sometimes be discussed since they can provide 
useful illustrations of the economic reasoning.  
The economic literature so far has mostly addressed public authority liability in a rather broad 
sense, assuming the public authority would be liable for behaviour (acts or omissions) of civil 
servants acting on behalf of the public authority. Less distinctions are made between the 
various public authorities on which liability could be imposed (e.g. local communities, 
provinces or states).  
We will, to the extent possible, try to follow the questionnaire in order to provide uniformity 
and ease the work of both comparative rapporteurs and readers. However, for obvious reasons 
it may not always be possible to fit the economic analysis into a questionnaire aiming at 
obtaining information on public authority liability in selected jurisdictions.  
 
Part I: Public authority liability; a theoretical economic approach 
                                                 

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I. Introduction 
A. Overview 
We will briefly sketch the historical evolution of the economic analysis of public authority  
liability as it appears from the literature (B); then we will discuss the important question to 
what extent it is at all possible to apply traditional economic analysis of accident law to a 
public authority (C). The question also arises whether public authority liability needs separate 
procedures or courts (D) and whether remedies other than compensation may be indicated (E). 
The core of this part will be (F) the policy analysis, where we provide the arguments in favour 
and against public authority liability from an economic perspective. This basic economic 
policy framework (F) will subsequently be used to discuss in more detail liability for fault 
(II), compensation for lawful acts (III) and the cases in part II.  
 
B. Historical Evolution 
As already mentioned in the introduction the interest of law and economics scholars in public 
authority liability has risen at a relatively late stage, at least compared to the huge amount of 
literature written on economic analysis of accidents caused by more traditional tortfeasors. 
The first publications came from the (then) Chicago-based economist Alan Sykes and his co-
author. A 1987-paper by Kramer and Sykes provided a legal and economic analysis of 
municipal liability under US law.
4
 Fishell and Sykes subsequently analyzed the scope of 
government liability for breach of contract from an economic perspective.
5
 The contractual 
liability of the state is, however, outside of the scope of this contribution. In a subsequent 
article with Eric Posner Posner and Sykes analyzed state and individual responsibility under 
international law.
6
 In their paper Posner and Sykes consider state liability as a form of 
vicarious liability and hold that the goal of this liability is, like in the case of vicarious 
liability, to provide incentives to principals to control the wrongful behaviour of agents whom 
they can monitor. They provide economic arguments for state and individual responsibility 
and also point at differences between ordinary vicarious liability and state liability. Some of 
their arguments will be discussed here. 
More recently Dari-Mattiacci, Garoupa and Gomez-Pomar provided an economic analysis of 
state liability.
7
 They argue that state liability generally has three purposes (all of which will be 
discussed in further detail in this contribution): 
1. To provide incentives to potential wrongdoers to act properly;  
2. To remove incentives for private parties to engage in socially detrimental behaviour and 
3. To generate information. 
 
                                                 
4
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5
 Daniel R. Fishell and Alan O. Sykes, Governmental liability for breach of contracts, American Law and 
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The most recent paper in this domain is a yet unpublished working paper by Gerrit De Geest 
on sovereign immunity.
8
 Starting from the American law on sovereign immunity De Geest 
analyses why particular actors (mainly public authorities) are immune from tort liability. He 
argues that, differently than ordinary actors, public authorities are often so-called multi-task 
agents (MTA) who have to balance various external tasks that in principle could provide 
benefits and costs to others, but, differently than with individual actors, not necessarily to 
themselves. For these multi-task agents it is important to provide them discretionary power to 
balance all external costs in an appropriate manner. This may be a strong argument for a more 
reduced liability of multi-task agents (such as public authorities) than for ordinary actors. 
In addition to these papers providing economic foundations for public authority liability or 
(under specific circumstances) immunity, Hans-Bernd Schäfer and some co-authors have to 
the contrary argued that it may be principally wrong to apply classic economic analysis of 
accident also to the state.
9
 Following public choice literature on bureaucracies, they reason 
that states, differently than individual actors, do not maximize utility and that it may hence be 
wrong to apply classic economic analysis, based on an assumption of utility maximization, to 
the state or other public authorities. We will immediately discuss these arguments below, 
when defining the public sphere.
10
  
 
c. The public sphere/Can traditional economic analysis be applied to a public authority? 
The question of the type of activity for which public authority liability can arise is, in the 
context of economic analysis, related to the just mentioned issue of whether it is at all 
appropriate to apply the economic approach designed for individual (or corporate) actors to 
public authorities. In other words: is the public sphere for the economic analysis of accident 
law different from the private sphere?  
It should be stressed that most of the economic literature concerning public authority liability 
focuses on liability of the state. We will, giving the goal of this project, rather refer to public 
authority liability. When, however, the economic arguments only refer to the situation of the 
state, this will of course be referred to as state liability.  
 
c. The public sphere/ Can traditional economic analysis be applied to a public authority? 
 
1. Public authorities don’t maximize utility 
                                                 
8
 G. De Geest, “Who should be immune from tort liability?”, 2011, Working Paper, Washington University 
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 As we already indicated, economic analysis traditionally assumes utility maximizing and 
profit maximizing individuals. This assumption is crucial to make predictions about how 
private entities respond to the incentives created by liability. Public authority however, unlike 
corporations, do not maximize profits. As a result public authorities may also lack the market 
discipline which is imposed on private injurers and traditional incentives mechanisms may 
therefore not work.
11
 If profit maximization is not the goal of a public authority it is less clear 
what objective functions public authorities strive for.
12
 The question to what extent imposing 
liability will provide incentives, e.g. to prevent harmful behaviour, is of course crucially 
linked to the functions the particular agent strives for.
13
  
This is precisely the reason why Schäfer argues that it may not be possible at all to apply 
traditional economic analysis of torts to the case of state liability.
14
 He has argued this more 
particularly with respect to the liability of Member States in the European Union for breaches 
of community law. Both the European Court of Justice and commentators had stated that they 
expect that liability of Member States will provide Member States an incentive to better 
comply with obligations under European law. In other words state liability would have a 
deterrent effect and prevent breaches. Schäfer strongly doubts this and principally argues that 
it is wrong to use traditional models of profit maximization to explain the behaviour of the 
state since the state does not aim at profit maximization but should rather, in terms of public 
choice and political economy, be analyzed via the incentives of their main actors, e.g. 
politicians. Their main concern would not be profit maximization, but re-election as a result 
of which they would tend to benefit interest groups that support their re-election.  
 
2. But still public authority liability can give incentives to politicians… 
Schäfer is obviously right that public authorities are different than individual actors. However, 
concluding from this that public authority liability may not have any deterrent effect at all is 
probably a too strong conclusion. In the end, some government entity must pay the costs 
created by liability. This entity will often face a budget constraint, and will not like to waste 
resources. Kramer and Sykes (1987) state that bureaucracies may respond to liability with 
behavior approximating cost minimization, and will thus adopt cost-effective measures to 
economize on liability.
15
 Indeed, the government (or more accurately, its officials) can be 
motivated by the desire to provide public services at minimum cost, since many officials 
confront demands for both increased levels of public services and lower taxes. They are likely 
to explore all opportunities for cost reduction. Taking reasonable preventive measures to 
reduce the burdens of liability is one such opportunity. Put differently, liability may affect the 
behavior of government officials through its political consequences. Liability diverts 
government funds and leaves political officials with fewer resources to satisfy the demands of 
their constituencies.
16
 Governments may then respond to liability with measures to avoid it 
that are “politically cost-effective”, though not necessarily “economically cost-effective”.17 
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It’s realistic to expect a positive correlation between political and economic cost-
effectiveness. However, the exact relation between them is unclear.
18
  
 
3… and to bureaucrats  
Schaëfer further argues that since state liability procedures (under European law) may only 
have effect years after the politician was in office, a finding of liability would not affect his 
incentive to comply with European law.
19
 Schaëfer therefore concludes that, differently than 
held by European legal commentators, one cannot expect any deterrent effect from state 
liability. Schäfer is of course right in arguing that the political consequences of liability can be 
limited due to timing distortions.
20
 Losses may be revealed only after years, and trials or 
settlement negotiations may take a long time. In such cases, the political cost may not be paid 
by the elected official who took the decision ending in the tort payment, but by a later entrant 
into office. We must stress however that much of the work of the government is carried out by 
bureaucrats, who often have a longer time perspective than elected officials. The most 
commonly applied rational choice model of bureaucratic behavior assumes that a bureaucrat 
will seek to maximize the size of her agency’s budget.21 They may thus have an incentive to 
take reasonable precautions in order to reduce the burdens of liability, even though they are 
not directly politically accountable and even though elected officials may have little control 
over the actions of these bureaucrats (in terms of selection, promotion, operation). This could 
also be held against Schäfer who claims that Member State liability may not prevent breaches 
of European law. For bureaucrats (who stay of course longer in office than the elected 
politicians) a conviction by the European Court of Justice for a failure to implement European 
directives correctly (and hence a breach of European law) does not only lead to a loss of 
budget, but also to a reputational loss which may precisely provide them incentives to prevent 
those breaches. 
 
4. Political control insufficient  
One may argue that even if the government cannot be held liable, it will have a sufficient 
incentive to prevent careless behavior because the political consequences of harmful behavior 
on itself can serve as a deterrent. If costs are externalized on citizens, this may affect their 
voting behavior. If this were true, a costly system of government liability would not be 
necessary. In reality however, the political consequences of cost externalization may be 
limited. Voters may not act as an effective check on liability for several reasons: accidents 
may happen infrequently, voters will often be ill-informed about them, and even if well-
informed, voters probably view the problem of uncompensated injuries caused by the state not 
as important as other issues. Also, the costs of uncompensated injuries may disproportionately 
fall upon poorer segments of the population with limited political power. In other words, the 
cost externalization strategy of the government may end up undetected, or at least unpunished 
by the voters.
22
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 Posner and Sykes, p. 90.  
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 It is related to the well-known Nimtof-syndrom (not in my term of office).  
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 See also Dari-Mattiacci, Garoupa and Gomez-Pomar, 16. 
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 See Niskanen, William A. Jr., Bureaucracy and Representative Government, 36-42, 1971. The reason is that 
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 See Kramer and Sykes (1987, p. 279).  
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5. Public authority liability can (theoretically) deter  
In sum, the mere fact that public authorities  have different incentives than private actors (in a 
potential accident setting) may indeed draw some caution with respect to the application of 
classic models of accident law to public authority liability. However, it may be a bridge too 
far to argue that as a consequence public authority liability would have no effect at all. 
Incentives may still result from public authority liability and even though they may only 
imperfectly affect the behaviour of politicians (given agency problems with voters and timing 
distortions), public authority liability may still have a deterrent effect since it could reduce the 
budget and reputation of bureaucrats who are equally affected by public authority liability and 
who may have a longer time horizon than politicians. The extent to which public authority 
liability does have a deterrent effect (which is the premise on which economic analysis of 
accident law is based) remains in the end of course an empirical issue, but empirical evidence 
to support or deny this claim is unfortunately lacking.  
 
D. Courts and procedures 
The issue of whether public authority liability is so much different that it would warrant 
distinctive courts and procedures has been briefly addressed by Dari-Mattiacci, Garoupa and 
Gomez-Pomar who argue that a special legal framework may indeed make sense.
23
 Their 
main economic argument in favour of specialised, administrative courts dealing with public 
authority liability is the advantage in information and thus the greater ability of these courts to 
deal with specific features related to public authorities. Of course, there are other potential 
benefits of specialization in general (whether through administrative courts or not). Cabrillo 
and Fitzpatrick (2008) mention the following benefits.
24
 First, specialization allows 
procedures to be adapted to the dispute matter. This can be important when costs can be saved 
by designing procedures proportional to the importance of the dispute. Second, specialization 
may also speed up the adjudication process, since procedures become more routinized as 
courts deal with the same issues repeatedly. Third, as already mentioned above for specialized 
administrative courts, specialization may lead to more accurate decisions if specialized judges 
have increased expertise in the area. Fourth, specialization can lead to greater harmony in the 
law since fewer courts are dealing with the same subject matter. Cabrillo and Fitzpatrick 
(2008) further mention two factors that may increase the value of specialization. First, the 
gains to specialization increase when there is a steady demand for adjudication in a particular 
area. In that case, specialized courts will not be vulnerable to fluctuations in caseloads. 
Second, increasingly complex cases increase the necessity for specialization. For such cases, 
there is a learning curve in deciding cases. Judges will be more willing to make the specific 
investments in acquiring knowledge of the special issues if they know thet will face many 
cases of the same type.  
There is, however, a trade off since specialisation makes accountability more difficult and the 
risk of capture
25
 increases.
26
 To the extent that public authority liability cases are different 
than ordinary tort cases a specialisation of the courts may be indicated. This would also be the 
case if public authority liability cases would lead to court congestion of the ordinary courts.
27
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25
 In this particular case meaning that the public authorities themselves would be better able to influence the 
specialized judges. 
26
 Dari-Mattiacci, Garoupa and Gomez-Pomar, 28. 
27
 Empirically this does not seem to be a strong argument since public authority  liability cases may not lead to a 
serious overburdening of the ordinary courts (Dari-Mattiacci, Garoupa and Gomez-Pomar, 29). 
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The capture danger not only exists because of specialisation. Creating a specialized court may 
also lead courts to act strategically and e.g. push for an expansion of their budget to attract 
new business. In other words: creating a specialized court may lead to a floodgate of cases 
simply because it is in the interest of the court itself. In other words, if capture problems are 
considered to be serious and more important than the advantages in information, economists 
would probably argue that specialisation of the court system may do more harm than good. 
This is especially the case if ordinary courts seem well able to deal with liability cases 
involving public authorities (in the sense that they are not significantly different than other 
accident cases) and do not lead to overburdening the courts.
28
 
 
E. Remedies 
Other remedies, like injuctive relief, may have certain advantages compared to damages.
29
 
One advantage of injunctive relief is that courts do not have to estimate damages, which may 
reduce litigation costs. Also, in those instances in which state liability for damages does not 
have a deterrent effect or only a very weak one, injunctive relief may be superior.  
Schäfer and Van den Bergh point to the fact that one problem with state liability is that it will 
often lead to pure financial losses Generally, economic analysis is reluctant as far as the 
compensation for pure economic loss is concerned.
30
 Schäfer and Van den Bergh hold that 
state liability (under European law) may only lead to efficient outcomes if the private losses 
of those who suffer are larger than the social losses.
31
 
Another point to be mentioned in the literature is that if the sole goal of public authority 
liability were to provide compensation to victims, this goal could also be realised via cheaper 
alternatives than public authority liability such as a publically funded insurance or a publically 
organised compensation fund. The transaction costs of those may be lower than of public 
authority liability with costly tort litigation. However, that argument of course disappears 
when compensation is not seen (as it is in economic analysis) as a goal in itself, but as a 
means to provide incentives to a potential tortfeasor. 
 
F. Policy Considerations 
In the law and economics literature, some potential advantages of public authority liability as 
well as some potential dangers have been identified. It seems useful to summarize these 
arguments pro and contra public authority liability since they also play a role in addressing the 
further questions of the questionnaire. 
 
1. Advantages of public authority liability 
As mentioned before, in theory public authority liability can fulfil three important economic 
functions: (a) it can provide incentives for public authorities to act properly; (b) it can remove 
incentives for private parties to engage in socially detrimental behaviour and finally (c) it can 
also generate valuable information.
32
 
                                                 
28
 And note further that overburdening of the courts can also be alleviated with other measures.  
29
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30
 See Jef de Mot, “Pure economic loss”, in Faure, M. (ed.), Tort Law and Economics, Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar, 2009, 201-214. 
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 Schäfer and Van den Bergh, 1998, 554-557. 
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 Dari-Mattiacci, Garoupa and Gomez-Pomar, 3. 
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a. Internalisation of costs 
Just like private entities, public authorities can be a source of negative externalities. Actions 
and failure to act of public authorities organs, bodies and officials may indeed cause 
substantial harm. An example of the former (actions) is a police officer who intervenes in a 
conflict too aggressively. An example of the latter (failure to act) concerns a police officer 
who impounds a driver’s vehicle and leaves her stranded in a high-crime area in the middle of 
the night.
33
 A first advantage of public authority liability is that it may internalize negative 
externalities. Liability stands as a deterrent to intentional harms and creates incentives to take 
precautions against accidental injuries.
34
 These precautions create benefits in the form of a 
reduction in the magnitude and number of accidents.
35
 For example, if a public authority is 
liable for failure to maintain public roads in adequate conditions for safe driving, the prospect 
of having to pay damages may provide incentives to choose the optimal level of maintenance 
expenditures. Likewise, liability can be a stimulus to persuade a (e.g. financial) supervisor to 
perform the tasks assigned to him with (greater) care.
36
   
 
b. Public authority liability to remove incentives 
In theory, public authority liability may also remove incentives for private parties to engage in 
socially detrimental behaviour when incentives are distorted.
37
 Take for example a corrupt 
official who refuses to issue a permit to an honest entrepreneur unless the entrepreneur would 
pay a bribe. In such a case public authority liability has the advantage that the victim of the 
wrongful behaviour can rely on damage compensation paid by the public authority, which 
would make it less likely that the entrepreneur will be compelled to bribe the public official. 
Public authority liability thus removes the incentives for private parties to cooperate with 
corrupt state officials.
38
 Another example concerns wrongful conviction.  From an ex ante 
perspectiven such a conviction might generate incentives to engage in illegal activities.
39
 The 
reason is that the possibility to be wrongfully sanctioned reduces the relative advantages of 
engaging in legal activities. The possibility to have state liability (and thus compensation) in 
case of a wrongful conviction may then correct these distorted incentives of citizens.
40
  In 
these cases, public authority liability is not only meant to provide the public authority with 
incentives, but also to realign the behavior of private parties with the socially desirable 
behavior by granting compensation for losses.   
 
c. Public authority liability as a monitoring device 
                                                 
33
 See the US case Wood v. Ostrander (879 F.2d 583, 9th Cir. 1989). 
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35
 Of course, they also impose costs on the entities subject to liability. Economic analysis undertakes to identify 
which rule creates the greatest excess of benefits over costs.  
36
 Before we already pointed to the fact that some literature doubts whether it is possible to fully apply the model 
of profit maximization to public authorities. We have however argued that even if there may be some limits in 
applying this model, liability rules may still have an important function in providing incentives for the 
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effects on crime levels, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2007, 269. 
40
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A final advantage of public authority liability is that it may provide accurate information 
about wrongful behaviour by public agencies.
41
 Public authority liability can indeed generate 
information on the performance of public authorities and could thus increase transparency of 
actions of civil servants within the public authority and increase the accountability of public 
authorities. In this case liability would be seen as a device whereby the public at large as a 
principal would monitor the behaviour of officials (as agents).
42
 However, it can be argued 
that this argument is not unproblematic: although the generation of information can be 
economically valuable, using the tort litigation system (only) to generate this information may 
be very costly. Moreover, public authority liability could be (ab)used to disfavor certain 
branches of government (e.g. the judiciary) and independent bodies (e.g. an independent 
regulatory agency), thus undermining the normal status quo of checks and balances.
43
  
 
2. Disadvantages of public authority liability 
a. A fundamental problem: uncertainty and the chilling effect  
Legal standards of due care are often uncertain. There are various factors that contribute to the 
existence of uncertainty. First, courts may err in determining due levels of care. For example, 
they may hold a civil servant negligent for granting a permit for an activity that later caused 
substantial harm, even though granting the permit was reasonable from an ex ante perspective. 
Conversely, the court may also erroneously not hold a civil servant liable for granting a 
permit. Second, courts can make errors in assessing a party’s true level of care. For example, 
a physician may have performed a diagnostic test
44, but the court might think that he didn’t. 
Coversely, the court may believe that the physician performed a diagnostic test while he did 
not. Third, a party may be unable to control completely his momentary level of care. For 
example, a driver may not be able to control his level of care at each instant, because of a 
lapse of attention, a sneeze, etc.
45
  
We will now examine the consequences of uncertain legal standards on the behavior of 
potential injurers in two situations: (1) the potential injurer acts on his own behalf, and (2) the 
potential injurer acts on behalf of a public authority. As we will see, the influence of 
uncertainty and potential solutions vary strongly across these two situations.  For reasons of 
simplicity, we will focus on the first type of uncertainty (courts may err in determining due 
levels of care). Courts may either be too severe (holding the defendant liable, even though he 
did not behave negligently, this is called a “type I-error”), or too lenient (not holding the 
defendant liable, even though he behaved negligently, this is called a “type II-error”). 
 
1. The potential injurer acts on his own behalf 
The significance of type I and type II errors is not the same. We can see this with a simple 
example. The first column represents the level of care a potential injurer can take. The second 
column represents the costs of each level of precaution (one unit of precaution costs 100 
                                                 
41
 Dari-Mattiacci, Garoupa and Gomez-Pomar, 4. 
42
 Generally,  the monitoring ability of the public authority is advanced as an important criterion to judge 
whether public authority liability is desirable. See e.g..Posner and Sykes 2007, 75 and 81. 
43
 Dari-Mattiacci, Garoupa and Gomez-Pomar, 23. 
44
 For example: listening carefully to a person’s heartbeat after some exercises. Such a test may not be easily 
verifiable, unlike for example an electrocardiogram. See Shavell, Steven. 2004, Foundations of Economic 
Analysis of Law, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, p. 225.  
45
 See Shavell (2004), p. 227.  
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Euro). The third column represents the expected accident costs (the probability of an accident 
times the loss in case an accident happens) for each level of precaution. 
 
Precaution level         Costs of precaution Expected accident costs Total social costs 
0   0   10.000     10.000 
1    100   5.000     5.100 
2   200   3.000     3.200 
3          300   2.500     2.800 
4   400   2.300     2.700 
5   500   2.250     2.750 
 
From the figures above, it’s easy to see that the optimal level of precaution equals 4 units. The 
total social costs – the sum of precaution costs and expected accident costs – is smaller for 4 
units (2.700) than for any other unit level (respectively 10.000, 5.100, 3.200, 2.800 and 
2.750). Under a perfect negligence rule, in which all judges set due care at 4 units, a potential 
injurer will take optimal care. If he takes less care (0,1,2 or 3), he bears his precaution costs 
and the expected accident costs (respectively 10.000, 5.100, 3.200 and 2.800). In other words, 
he bears the total social costs. But total social costs are lowest for 4 units (2.700), and if he 
takes 4 units, he doesn’t even bear all costs, but only the costs of precaution (400).  Thus he 
will not take less than 4 units. Similarly, the potential injurer will not take more precaution 
than the socially optimal level of due care (5 units). The reason is that there’s no benefit for 
the injurer to take more than 4 units. As soon as he takes 4 units, he will never have to pay 
damages. If he takes 4 units, his cost equals 400. If he takes 5 units, his cost equals 500. So 
taking 4 units is cheaper.  
Things change however when we introduce the possibility of judicial error. Suppose the 
injurer knows that judges set due care at 3 units instead of 4. Then it’s easy to see that a 
potential injurer will take 3 units instead of 4. As soon as he takes 3 units of care, he will not 
be held liable for any damages. His private cost is minimal when he takes 3 units of care (300 
versus respectively 10.000, 5.100, 3.200, 400 and 500). Note that the advantage for the 
potential injurer for this type of judicial error equals 100. Without the error, the injurer would 
have spend 4 units of care (cost of 400), with the error he only spends 3 units (cost of 300). 
Lets now look at the other type of error. Suppose the potential injurer knows that judges set 
due care at 5 units. Then we can see that he will effectively take 5 units of care. For any lower 
number of units, the injurer will bear all the costs (10.000, 5.100, 2.800, 2.700). If he takes 5 
units, he only bears the costs of precaution (500). Note that the advantage of taking too much 
care is quite large. If the injurer only takes 4 units, he bears an expected cost of 2.700. If he 
takes 5 units, he only pays 500. So in conclusion, the effect of type I and type II errors is 
different. Even when both type of errors are equally likely from an ex ante perspective (e.g. 
there’s a 10 percent chance for a Type I error and a 10 percent chance for a Type II error), 
potential injurers will be more inclined to take too much care than too little care.  In the next 
section, we will see that the incentive to take too much care may be exacerbated when a 
public authority is involved. 
 
2. The potential injurer acts on behalf of a public authority 
 11 
Above we have seen that liability with uncertain due care standards may lead to inefficient 
levels of precaution (most often overprecaution). We now argue that this problem is much 
worse where a public authority is involved. A (private) tortfeasor typically balances an 
external cost (the expected accident cost) against an internal cost (the precaution cost). The 
incentive of such a tortfeasor to take too much precuation is limited, since he has to pay all the 
costs of overprecaution.  However, public authority officials typically balance two external 
costs. Unlike the private tortfeasor, the public authority itself does not bear the costs of 
overprecaution. The public authority is thus much faster inclined towards taking too much 
precaution, since others are bearing the costs of it. For example, firefighters balance damage 
caused by water (due to an intervention) against damage caused by fire (the costs of inaction). 
Both of these costs are externalized. Likewise, a safety inspector balances the expected 
accidents costs against the precaution costs. The former are borne by the victims (in case of an 
accident), the latter by the inspected firm.
46
  Briefly summarized, uncertainty of legal 
standards together with the possibility of the government to externalize the costs of 
overprecaution, may lead to a strong chilling effect.
47
  
The chilling effect explains several aspects of legal rules that deal with public authority 
liability: 
 
(1) Immunity for judges 
Judges enjoy a privileged status regardless of the legal regime. In the US, judges enjoy 
absolute immunity when performing judicial tasks. When they perform administrative or 
executive tasks, they only enjoy qualified immunity (like other administrative officials). They 
also lose their absolute immunity when they act “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction over 
the subject-matter”. As a matter of principle, US judges cannot be sued for mistakes in the 
application of the law. In France, judges may not be sued personally for errors while 
performing their duties. However, the State has to compensate damages in case of grave 
judicial error and denial of justice. If the State has compensated the injured party, it has a right 
of recourse against the judge who issued the erroneous decision. However, recourse is hardly 
ever filed.
48
 In Germany, the plaintiff can sue the state and the judge for damages suffered due 
to judicial misconduct. 
 
It’s not difficult to see what the chilling effect would contain if judges would not enjoy any 
immunity or only a weak type of immunity when performing judicial tasks. First of all, there’s 
a danger that a judge deciding a case with the knowledge that the losing party may bring a 
liability suit, would have an incentive to rule against the party which is least likely to do so. 
                                                 
46
 As De Geest (2011) arguers, these injurers are in a multitasking agent situation. The multitask agent literature 
shows that incentives usually need to be softer for these agents than for single-task agents, because hard 
incentives for one output can distort the incentives for the other output. For example, professors who are paid per 
publication may neglect their teaching efforts, when these teaching efforts are hard to verify (and thus to 
sanction). In the context of liability, multitask agents should be allowed to exercise discretion within a well-
defined zone with clear minimum constraints. The reason is that uncertainty has a strong chilling effect in a 
multitask agent situation, because the multitask agent does not internalize the precaution costs. For example, if a 
public servant  needs to decide whether a firm should get a permit or not to carry out a risky activity that can 
cause substantial harm to third parties. See G. De Geest, “Who Should be Immune from Tort Liability?”.  
47
 However, Markesinis et al. qualify this chilling effect as “just speculation”, arguing that there would be no 
empirical evidence supporting this chilling effect. See Markesinis, B.S. and others, Tortious liability of statutory 
bodies, 78-81. 
48
 See Canivet, G., and Joly-Hurard, J. 2004. La déontologie des magistrats.Paris: Dalloz. 
 12 
This will be especially the case when, after careful examination of the case, the judge still has 
some residual uncertainty as to what the correct solution is for the case. Of course, this can 
systematically increase the error rate of the judicial system. A judge may be 80 % certain that 
party A should win, but if he knows that party A is unlikely to have the funds to bring a 
liability case, he may decide in favor of party B, who is more likely to bring such a suit if he 
loses. More generally, without immunity for judges, more sophisticated, less capital-
constrained parties will win more often because they are more likely to retaliate against a 
judge. Second, without judicial immunity judges could, as long as there’s some ambiguity, 
have an increased incentive to conclude that they do not have jurisdiction over a complex 
case, for which making mistakes is not unlikely. Third, judges would take considerably more 
time in deciding cases, so as to minimize the risk of error. Judges would spend much more 
time on a case than is warranted from a social cost perspective. Suppose a judge could reduce 
the error rate with 5 % (e.g. improve his accuracy from 90 % to 95 %) by working another 
week on a case. From his personal perspective, this could be worthwhile if he would be liable 
for an erroneous decision, especially in cases that involve large amounts. However, from a 
social perspective, the benefit may be much smaller, given that a relatively small reduction in 
the error rate (5%) probably does not have a substantial impact on potential injurers.  Note 
that these several types of chilling effects would be more likely in jurisdictions where judges 
have heavy workloads. Heavier caseloads mean a greater chance of making an error.   
This theoretical framework explains the types of decisions and actions for which judges enjoy 
(no) immunity. Uncertainty is the key issue. In a recent article Tsaoussi and Zervogianni 
(2010)
49
, without explicitly relying on the framework we have discussed above, describe the 
concept of “inexcusable judicial error”. They aim at identifying cases where the act or 
omission of the judge can be qualified as unacceptable. The categories are: 
(1) Intentional behavior on the part of the judge (e.g. bribery) 
(2) Denial of justice or inordinate delays in pending cases. Of course, judges cannot be 
held accountable for excessive caseloads, but they can be better or worse managers of 
their caseloads.  
(3) Serious violations of the procedural rules which influence the outcome of the trial (e.g. 
violation of the right to be heard, failure of the judge to disqualify himself because of 
conflict of interests etc.) 
(4) Grave legal errors in the judicial opinion itself (e.g. applying an important law that had 
been abrogated, especially if the attorney has mentioned the new law; an interpretation 
incompatible with the letter of the law as well as the unanimous opinion of legal 
theory and case-law) 
(5) Grave error in the evaluation of the facts of the case (e.g. the judge confuses the facts 
of different cases) 
(6) Abuse of power, which often demonstrates a lack of impartiality (e.g. determining 
maintenance after divorce at an amount which is manifestly beyond the ability of the 
defendant to pay).  
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Note that these categories fit relatively well in the framework we have described above. 
Reasonably prudent judges can be virtually certain that they will not make any of these types 
of error.  
Of course, we need to mention that broad immunities for judges come at a cost. Compared to 
a situation with full liability, judges may on average take less effort to reach good decisions. 
Also, there are other instruments available that may have some deterrent effect on judges.
50
 
First, in most jurisdictions, litigants can appeal against decisions which they consider 
erroneous. It is however unknown how strong the deterrent effect of appeals is. Judgments 
can be reversed also for minor defects, and they can even be reversed in the absence of an 
error (e.g. because of different political preferences between the initial judge and the appeal 
judge(s)). Note further that the possibility of appeals can even increase the number of 
erroneous decisions. If judges in the lower courts know that their mistakes can still be 
corrected by the higher courts, their conscience may be relieved when they take a hasty 
decision. Second, judges are in principle liable for the criminal offences they commit when 
performing their duties (e.g. bribery). Although criminal liability may create strong 
incentives, its scope is limited since it focuses only on intentional behavior of the judge. 
Third, there is the possibility of disciplinary liability which aims to maintain a minimum 
professional standard and prevent deviations from judicial deontology. While the scope of 
disciplinary liability is much larger than the scope of criminal liability, its deterrent effect is 
much lower. The initiative for the initiation of the procedure often rests with the Minister of 
Justice or the magistracy itself.
51
  Furthermore, the body that needs to decide is often 
comprised of judges (solely or in majority).
52
 Because of a strong sense of collegiality among 
judges, we may expect a rather low number of convictions. Also, except for severe sanctions 
like disqualification, the reputational costs of a conviction may be quite low because of 
limited publicity or because of confidentiality.
53
  
Also Schäfer and Van den Bergh argue that the uncertainty concerning legal standards (for 
example in European law) is a strong argument to be very reluctant with a strict state liability. 
They argue in favour of a rule of “obvious negligence”, since otherwise overdeterrence may 
occur.
54
   
 
(2) Qualified immunity for civil servants 
In many jurisdictions, civil servants enjoy qualified immunity. For example, in Belgium they 
can only be held personally liable in the event of intentional negligence, gross negligence or a 
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frequently occurring normal negligence.
55
 In many US states, firefighters enjoy immunity for 
firefighting mistakes (for emergency situations), as long as they did not involve gross 
negligence or wanton or willful conduct.
56
   
What is the purpose of these immunities? We can see this by examining what would happen 
in the absense of such immunities. An official (e.g. a policeman, a firefighter etc.) can often 
cause damage that is far beyond his or her financial means. This damage may be caused even 
by a slight mistake, a memory lapse etc. Without immunity many risk-averse officials will 
invest a portion of their earnings in a third-party insurance to overcome the possibility of 
losing his wealth by such faults. By paying a premium, the uncertainty about future income is 
removed. However, if every single official has to buy his own insurance policy, the 
transaction costs will be quite high. It may be cheaper to let the public authority take out 
insurance for all officials and reduce the wage by the amount of the premium, or to let the 
public authority to insure itself. In these cases, the transaction costs would be a lot smaller or 
fall away altogether. Note that without immunity, it will be necessary to compensate the 
official for the risk he’s taking (a small, unintentional mistake may lead to huge claims) in the 
form of a higher wage. For some functions that could give rise to very serious claims, this 
increase in wage may be quite substantial. This higher wage may especially attract individuals 
who overestimate their own capabilities. This can be seen as a form of the “winner’s curse”. 
Those individuals who make the largest errors about their own capabilities, are most likely to 
try to obtain the job with the higher wage. 
So the economic rationale for qualified immunities seems to be the savings of transaction 
costs. However, this immunity also tackles the chilling effect to some extent. As we have 
argued above, without immunity, risk-averse government officials will take insurance. 
However, to avoid problems of moral hazard, insurance coverage will seldomly be complete. 
Most insurance contracts include some form of co-insurance (deductibles etc.). Also, premia 
may increase after a civil servant has been convicted of (even the slightest) negligent 
behavior. To prevent all this, civil servants may engage in chilling behavior. For example, in 
the absence of immunities, civil servants may take too much time and effort to check whether 
certain conditions are fulfilled to grant a permit.    
Of course, there is a downside to these qualified immunities. The immunities may reduce the 
incentive of some civil servants to behave cautiously. There is thus a risk of moral hazard. 
However, the scope of the immunities may reduce this risk significantly. For example, as we 
have seen in Belgium, there’s no immunity for frequently occurring negligence. Also, civil 
servants may face other sanctions which may have some deterrent effect.
57
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b. May dilute the incentives of potential victims 
If public authority liability would fail to provide correct incentives to civil servants it may in 
the end increase the accident risk.
58
 In so-called bilateral accident situations, e.g. where both 
the potential injurer and the potential victim can influence the accident risk public authority 
liability may induce potential victims to take less precautions since they count on being 
compensated by the public authority.
59
 Of course the usual mechanism to deal with this 
potential moral hazard on the side of the victim is to introduce a contributory negligence rule. 
Such a rule leads to a reduction of the compensation for the victim to the extent that the 
victim contributed to the loss.
60
 Take the example of a bad road: normally victims, being 
aware of the bad state of the road, should take more care and drive slowly to prevent an 
accident. Public authority liability for failure to maintain the road may dilute the incentives of 
victims for taking proper care. Of course this problem only arises in so-called bilateral 
accident situations. If the accident is one of so-called unilateral precaution (where only the 
injurer, e.g. the public authority can take efficient care to prevent the accident) victims cannot 
take efficient measures to reduce the accident risk and the moral hazard problem does not 
arise.
61
   
 
c. May lead to less monitoring or a cover-up (in case of strict vicarious liability) 
Arlen (1994) has argued that corporate criminal liability, or more generally vicarious liability 
of firms for their agents’ intentional wrongdoing, can generate perverse incentives.62 Her 
argument is that when the misconduct of the agent is difficult to detect, the firm will have a 
substantial advantage in monitoring the behaviour and finding out the wrongful acts. 
However, under a vicarious liability regime the corporation may not have optimal incentives 
(or none at all) to monitor the behaviour of its agent since finding out a mishap can potentially 
lead to its own liability, thus raising the firms expected liability costs.   A similar perverse 
effect could equally arise under public authority liability: given that supervision and control 
can provide evidence against the public authority and lead to liability, such liability may 
provide a disincentive to monitor and an incentive to cover up misbehaviour by officials. Note 
however that this is mainly an argument which arises in case of strict vicarious liability, but 
not necessarily in case of a duty based liability system (based on negligence).  
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d. Litigation costs 
Although tort liability for a public authority may have several benefits (e.g. deterrence), any 
liability system also entails litigation costs. Litigation costs may serve as an argument against 
public authority liability, but only when these costs outweigh the benefits. Unfortunately, 
there’s no decisive empirical evidence available. 
 
e. Aggravation of budget constraints 
Posner and Sykes (2007) explain that public authority liability remains in a way a vicarious 
liability system which should provide the state an incentive to control the behaviour of civil 
servants of whom they can monitor the behaviour. After all, it is not the public authority itself 
that acts. Ordinary people act on its behalf.
63
 A basic assumption in a vicarious liability 
system like public authority liability is that the public authority subsequently has an ability to 
monitor their civil servants and correct their behaviour. For a variety of reasons however, the 
possibilities for such monitoring may sometimes be rather limited.
64
 In these cases, the public 
authority may be left with a finding of liability and a duty to compensate whereas the positive 
effects (providing better incentives for behaviour) may be doubtful. The accident costs which 
as a result of liability fall on the public authority will lead to further budget constraints, but 
not necessarily for the activity which produced the accident.
65
 The budget constraint may also 
affect other activities of the public authority which could have been socially beneficial.
66
 
67
   
 
f. The case of supervision: public authority liability may reduce incentives of the supervisee 
A potential disadvantage of supervisor liability is that the supervisee might be inclined to 
become less careful, in the knowledge that he is watched by the supervisor. The thought 
process of the supervisee may go as follows: “If I take less care and this leads to a potentially 
negative situation (e.g. the house of the supervisee collapses; the airplane of the supervisee 
crashes etc.), there are two possibilities. Either the supervisor corrects me, and then I adopt 
the necessary changes. Or the supervisor doesn’t correct me, and then there’s a chance that the 
supervisor will also be held negligent if something goes wrong. In such a case I don’t have to 
pay the full damage”. Of course, whether a supervisee will actually behave like this (and the 
extent of it), depends on many factors,  like how easy it is for the supervisor to detect 
suboptimal behavior of the supervisee ex ante, whether there are significant administrative or 
criminal sanctions available when the supervisor detects less than optimal behavior, whether 
suboptimal care of the supervisor is verifiable ex post, whether there is a rule of comparative 
negligence or contributory negligence, whether the supervisee could be personally hurt etc. In 
general, we shouldn’t expect the moral hazard problem to be so great that supervisory liability 
should be abolished completely. To preserve the incentives of the supervisor, there should at 
least be liability for intentional harm and for gross negligence. The argument for simple 
negligence for the supervisor however is weaker, and this is true not only because of a 
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potential moral hazard problem. If the government is liable even for small errors, in the end 
these costs may still be borne by the supervisees, for example through fees. This comes down 
to a sort of compulsory insurance system. Perhaps some firms would have preferred to self-
insure, but this will not be possible if the supervisor is liable even for very small mistakes. 
Note that the case of excluding liability for small mistakes towards third parties (others than 
the supervisee) may be quite weak. These third parties often do not have any influence on the 
occurrence of a negative event (little risk for moral hazard) and the government may also be 
the better risk bearer towards these third parties.  
  
II. Liability for unlawful conduct or fault 
Building further on the fundamentals of the economic analysis of public authority liability 
described above, we can now address a few more specific issues from the questionnaire 
related to liability for unlawful conduct or fault.  
 
A. Basic principles and B.  Definitions 
One of the fundamental theories of the economic analysis of tort law is the Learned Hand 
formula. According to this formula developed by Judge Learned Hand
68
, a tortfeasor should 
be held liable if he didn’t take a precautionary measure whose cost was less than the reduction 
in expected harm that would have resulted from taking this measure. If C is the cost of 
prevention, P the reduction in the probability of harm due to the precautionary measure and H 
is the harm in case of an accident, then the tortfeasor should take the precaution if C < P x H. 
A tortfeasor should be held liable if he didn’t take the precautionary measure while C < P x H, 
no matter how small the difference between C and P x H is. In other words, a tortfeasor 
should be liable even for the slightest fault.  
In a world with perfect information, courts should apply this formula to a public authority as 
well, without exceptions. As discussed before however, uncertainty in determining optimal 
standards and the fact that public authorities have to be considered as multi-task agents, make 
things more complex. Since a multi-task agent has to balance various external costs, there is a 
serious danger that such an agent will take too much precaution.
69
   Consequently, negligence 
rules for multi-task agents (like public authorities) should be more precise and predictable. 
This means that negligence regimes will often take the form of gross negligence or 
recklessness for multi-task injurers, or that some discretion will be granted (see further). 
These norms have the characteristics of minimum norms and are therefore more predictable 
norms.
70
 
However, a difference should be made when officials violate a clearly defined norm which 
removes any degree of choice. De Geest presents the example of an agency that issued a 
licence for an all-round polio vaccine without first receiving test data that the manufacturer 
must submit according to the law. The plaintiff alleged that thereby the bureau violated its 
own clear standards of testing all vaccine lots. This is a case where no immunity would exist 
and liability would hence be accepted.
71
 The same would be the case when agencies make a 
policy choice that no reasonable person could ever make. The example he provides is the 
decision to offer a service but do it negligently. It considered the case of the US coastguard 
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who decided to provide a particular lighthouse service as a result of which it was obliged to 
keep it in good working order once it had decided to provide the service. Once it announced 
the lighthouse service and ships started to rely on it, it seems clearly unreasonable not to 
maintain it properly.
72
 
When there are hence clearly defined norms (either statutory norms, or policies or guidelines) 
which are violated, the arguments for deviations from the general principles of tort law 
disappear. The reason is obviously that when a clearly defined norm exists the uncertainty 
problem is then indeed eliminated.  
Next we consider the question whether in establishing liability, the test should be the 
unlawfulness of the conduct or the fault of whoever was responsible for it. From an economic 
perspective, ideally, fault should be the key issue, not unlawfulness. An example may 
illustrate this. Suppose a civil servant has to take a decision in 1000 (e.g. building) cases each 
year. In each case, he needs to check whether the 10 specific regulations are complied with. It 
may very well be that it’s economically optimal that the civil servant invests his time and 
effort in these cases until there will be on average 995 cases decided correctly, and 5 not. It 
may thus be the case that further investments by the civil servant are not socially desirable, 
even though they could still reduce his error rate. This will be the case when the benefits of 
further investments (reduced error costs) are smaller than their costs (extra time, effort etc.).  
So even when the civil servant behaves optimally (no fault), there may still be an unlawful 
decision on his part (e.g. on average 5 in 1000). Now there are two possibilities: either the 
amount of time and effort the civil servant spends on his tasks are verifiable for the courts, or 
either they are not. In the former case, the courts can simply check whether the civil servant 
acted negligently or not. Even though the conduct may have been unlawful, it could very well 
be that he didn’t make a fault. In the latter case, unlawfulness should generally lead to the 
conclusion that there has been a fault. The alternative would be not ever to hold the civil 
servant liable, because he could always claim that the unlawfulness was a mere accident 
(occurring 5 in 1000 times even when he behaves without fault). In other words, when 
behavior is not verifiable (at all), it may be wise to assimilate unlawfulness with fault, to 
preserve incentives. Otherwise put, this comes down to creating a pocket of strict liability into 
the negligence rule.
73
  
 
C. Discretion and Justiciability 
A general feature of multi-task agents like public authorities is that they make discretionary 
decisions. Discretion in this particular context means a balancing. De Geest (2011) provides 
the example of fire-fighters who balance the damage caused by water (costs of the 
intervention) against damage caused by the fire (costs of omission). Both costs are 
externalised by the fire-fighter. In general for discretionary decisions, several costs (or 
benefits) have to be balanced in order to choose the policy that (hopefully) minimises the 
costs or maximises the benefits for society.
74
 Decisions by public authorities as multi-task 
agents often require a balancing and they are hence qualified as “discretionary decisions”. In 
addition to the example of the fire-fighter one can also refer to the example of an 
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administrative agency that has to decide on approving a particular drug: it has to balance the 
potential costs of not allowing the drug (losing the beneficial effects of the drug and hence 
more illnesses which cannot be prevented) against yet another external cost (the potential 
danger of side effects or other negative effects resulting from the use of the drugs).  
 
Latitude is often given to public authorities in the exercise of their discretion. The idea is that 
public authorities making discretionary decisions must balance the different interests affected 
as they think fit. It is quite generally accepted that the courts should not always review this 
process by imposing liability. For example, in 1945 in the US, the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(28 U.S.C. 1346) introduced governmental liability for common law torts against federal 
officials. One important exception in that Act is the “discretionary function exception” (28 
U.S.C. 2680). The Act does not define what discretionary activities are, so the courts have 
attempted to define the concept. Generally, discretionary acts are of a “judgemental, planning, 
or policy nature”.75 “Ministerial activities”, which merely involve the execution of set tasks, 
do not enjoy this immunity.  
 
This immunity for discretionary acts is in accordance with the uncertainty framework we have 
described above. When there’s no room for discretion (the law specifies the precise actions 
the official must take), there’s no uncertainty on behalf of the government official and no 
need for immunity. When the law fails to specify the precise action that the officer must take, 
there’s room for uncertainty and a chilling effect may result in the absence of immunity. 
However, this does not imply that discretionary duties should always be immune from tort 
liability. When an official (or agency…) makes a policy choice that no reasonable person 
would ever make, there should be no immunity. This exception will not lead to chilling 
behavior.  
 
D. Individual and Institutional Liability 
 
1. Agent immunity and vicarious liability of the public authority?  
Economic theory has argued that under some conditions, the division of liability between the 
public authority and its agents does not matter from the perspective of efficiency.
76
  These 
conditions are: (1) The employee has sufficient assets to pay any conceivable judgment 
against him in full; (2) There is no difficulty in identifying the employee who caused the 
harm; and (3) the transaction costs of contracts that include terms to allocate liability between 
the public authority and the employee are small. The intuition behind this proposition is very 
simple. Suppose that an optimal allocation of liability between the public authority and its 
employee exists for each possible accident. Such an allocation will take into account 
differences in risk aversion and the moral hazard associated with shifting liability away from 
the active wrongdoer. When transaction costs are low, regardless of the initial locus of 
liability, the public authority and its employee can reconstruct this optimal allocation by an 
appropriate provision in the contract between them.
77
 Consequently, the employee will face 
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the same incentives for care, the public authority will face the same incentives to monitor, and 
each party will face the same risks. Conditions one and two ensure that the total amount paid 
to the plaintiff by the public authority and the employee remains the same (with or without 
liability for the public authority). Thus the renegotiated agreement in a system of personal and 
public authority liability can exactly replicate the division of liability agreed to by the public 
authority and the employee in the absence of public authority liability (but with personal 
liability).  
Of course, the conditions required for this benchmark case will not hold in many settings. 
First, at times it may be impossible for an injured party to identify the government employee 
that caused the harm. Second, many employees do not own enough personal assets to pay 
anything more than the most modest tort judgments awarded against them. Third, various 
transaction costs of contracting may prevent the public authority and its employees from 
allocating liability between them in an optimal way.  In these cases, the locus of liability may 
matter a lot.  
We now look at the differences between personal liability (only the civil servant can be held 
liable) and vicarious liability (also the public authority can be held liable if a civil servant 
acted negligently) when the civil servant is judgment proof or when it’s difficult to identify 
the civil servant who caused the harm. Personal liability allows the public authority to 
externalize the costs of its activities by passing off all or part of the losses occasioned by the 
commission of a tort onto the victim. One may wonder why the public authority would have 
an incentive to actually externalize costs. Some may think that we may expect such behavior 
from private firms, but not from the public authority who is not motivated by the desire to 
maximize profits. However, this argument is flawed. As argued before, the public authority 
(or more accurately, its officials) can be motivated be the desire to provide public services at 
minimum cost, since many officials confront demands for both increased levels of public 
services and lower taxes. So also for the public authority there may be powerful incentives to 
take advantage of the opportunity to externalize liability.
78
 We now examine the 
consequences of this potential to externalize costs. First, it may lead to inadequate incentives 
to take precautions against wrongdoing. Civil servants may exercise too little care in 
performing their duties. Also, the incentive of the public authority to institute supervision, 
monitoring and training may be diminished. In theory, also the opposite problem could occur: 
risk-averse civil servants may exercise inefficiently high levels of care. However, we are 
focusing on cases for which there’s no economic rationale for immunity. These torts involve 
intentional harms or reckless behavior and usually reflect indifference to well-settlled legal 
requirements. Most of these torts are easily avoidable. Few civil servants need fear that they 
will accidentally commit them. So the problem of inefficient high levels of care is largely 
academic under these circumstances.  We now turn to a second consequence of the potential 
to externalize costs: inefficiency in risk allocation. The costs of injuries will fall on the victim 
and the individual wrongdoer, who are often risk averse. The efficiency of risk bearing can be 
improved by shifting the risk to a less risk-averse entity. Note that first-party insurance is not 
always a satisfactory method of risk distribution: not all torts are insurable in the insurance 
market (e.g. loss of liberty and income due to unlawful confinement). Third, externalization of 
costs may increase the scale of activity of the public authority. However, it’s unclear whether 
this is inefficient or not. The reason is that there’s no generally accepted theory of how the 
scale of public sector activity is determined. Some theories predict that the scale of 
government activity will tend to be inefficiently small, and some predict the opposite.
79
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We now analyze how vicarious liability may change things. First, vicarious liability can 
motivate the public authority to adopt cost-effective measures to reduce the incidence of 
misconduct. These measures can include better training programs, improved incentive 
schemes (penalty/reward), greater supervision of employees etc. However, if the transaction 
costs of these measures are high, the government may decide not to take them. In such a case, 
vicarious liability may have a serious downside. Under vicarious liability, successful plaintiffs 
tend to collect their judgments from the public authority (who has deep pockets), even if the 
individual wrongdoer remains liable. But if the individual wrongdoer does not bear the cost of 
his wrongdoing, his incentive to avoid misconduct will decrease. In other words, when 
transaction costs are large, vicarious liability may insulate potential wrongdoers from liability. 
Clearly, the economic benefits of vicarious liability are greater, the smaller the transaction 
costs to the public authority of creating effective incentives for civil servants to avoid 
wrongdoing. Second, vicarious liability may not only affect incentives, it also has 
implications for the distribution of risk. Generally, vicarious liability will ameliorate the 
inefficient allocation of risk that would result under a rule of personal liability. The public 
authority is typically a superior risk bearer that can distribute the risk among the broad 
taxpaying public. Third, the greater cost internalization under vicarious liability can reduce 
the scale of government activity. However, as argued above, we don’t know whether this is a 
good or bad thing.  
 
2. Immunity for the agent: should the immunity extend to the public authority? 
Above we have already seen that civil servants in many countries enjoy a qualified immunity 
and that judges generally enjoy broad immunities. Now the question rises: should the state 
enjoy the same immunity as its agent? Does the economic rationale for agent immunity 
equally apply to the public authority? Do other arguments argue in favor of state immunity? 
Unlike in the previous section, making the public authority vicariously liable cannot lead the 
agent to exercise less care. The reason is that the agent is already immune. So adding a deep-
pocket defendant (the public authority) does not alter the incentives of the agent. Next, 
vicarious liability can motivate the public authority to adopt cost-effective measures to reduce 
the incidence of negligent conduct. We should, however, refer to the discussion above, 
explaining that one of the disadvantages of public authority liability is that the deterrent effect 
of liability rules may not work because the principal (the public authority) may lack an 
adequate chain of command to control the agent (the civil servant). In this respect Posner and 
Sykes note that there are important differences between vicarious liability for corporations 
(employers for their employees) on the one hand and for a public authority  on the other hand. 
For example imposing vicarious liability on firms may lead to a disintegration of firms to 
avoid liability; this is of course not an option for a public authority.
80
 Also, the firms have the 
possibility to increase the salary for employees that would have to pay fines. Such a 
possibility may not exist within public administrations, where increasing salaries is bound to 
specific rules. The fact that actual compensation for employees would not be possible may 
also create a risk of adverse selection since the public service would then only become 
attractive for lower qualified staff.
81
 The problem therefore arises that it may not be possible 
to remedy problems due to failures in the chain of command.
82
 
 
                                                 
80
 Dari-Mattiacci, Garoupa and Gomez-Pomar, 24. 
81
 Dari-Mattiacci, Garoupa and Gomez-Pomar, 25; obviously this is rather an argument against individual 
liability of the civil servant and hence in favour of an immunity for the agent.  
82
 Dari-Mattiacci, Garoupa and Gomez-Pomar, 25-26. 
 22 
Although vicarious liability may motivate the public authority to adopt cost-effective 
measures to reduce the incidence of negligent conduct, it’s also possible that the public 
authority will engage in inefficient self-protective behavior. For example, it may give 
instructions to civil servants that permits should not be granted as soon as there’s a possibility, 
no matter how small or remote, that the underlying activity could cause harm.  Indeed, such 
behavior is by no means unique to a regime of personal liability. The emergence of self-
protective behavior may justify governmental immunity just as its emergence under personal 
liability may justify individual immunity (see Kramer and Sykes, 1987, p. 300). So when the 
risk of self-protective behavior is large, immunity of the public authority may be a wise 
option. Here we can refer to our discussion of discretionary decisions.
83
 
Turning from incentives to risk, one advantage of public authority liability may be a better 
risk allocation. Generally, a public authority is a better risk bearer than the injured party. 
However, risk sharing benefits may not suffice to justify the imposition of civil liability on the 
public authority: there may be alternative mechanisms available that redistribute the risk far 
more cheaply than the costly litigation system.
84
 
 
E. Range of Application 
We have previously argued that the chilling effect may provide a rationale for government 
immunities. The chilling effect is highly dependent on the level of uncertainty. So logically, 
when there’s a lot of uncertainty, there should be broad immunities. According to De Geest 
(2011), this explains why legislators often have absolute immunity: “… for some functions, 
the set of minimum norms may be virtually empty-that is, it may be impossible to define a set 
of decisions that all reasonable persons believe to be clearly wrong. This may indeed explain 
why members of congress and the US President enjoy “absolute immunity”: Their job is 
making policy decisions, and the set of policy decisions they could realistically make that all 
reasonable persons consider unreasonable is virtually empty… The point is that in a modern 
democracy with many checks and balances it is nearly impossible to make policy decisions 
that 99 % of the people find manifestly unreasonable.  
Put briefly, the starting point should be that public authority liability should extend to all 
public bodies. However, depending on the extent of uncertainties that these bodies face, broad 
or narrow immunities may enhance social welfare.  
 
F. Violations of Human Rights 
From an economic perspective, one important problem with violations of human rights is the 
fact that it can be hard to quantify the damages suffered because of these violations. In those 
cases where tort law has a deterrent effect, setting damages too low may weaken this deterrent 
effect.  
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G. Defences 
Defences that the claimant failed to exhaust all available appeals, complaint, procedures etc. 
before claiming on the basis of public authority liability can make sense from an economic 
perspective. First, using appeals, complaints etc. will often mitigate the loss of the victim. 
Allowing a defence that the claimant failed to exhaust all procedures will thus give the victim 
an incentive to mitigate his losses. Second, these procedures can produce valuable 
information, which the court can then use to determine whether or not the public authority 
should be held liable. 
 
H. Special Categories of Case 
Some countries like Germany, England and Belgium have introduced immunities for financial 
supervisors through statute.  For Germany, the Finanzdienstleistungsaufsichtsgesetz has 
introduced a general immunity (for the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht).
85
 In 
Belgium (Commissie voor het Bank- en Financiewezen; Controledienst voor de 
Verzekeringen) and England, liability is not entirely excluded. In Belgium, liability is limited 
to cases of intent and gross negligence.
86
 In England, liability is only possible for cases of bad 
faith or breach of the Human Rights Act of 1998.
87
 These immunities can be seen as a 
measure to prevent chilling effects. Financial supervisors often have to weigh delicate 
interests. If a financial institution has problems and the financial supervisor reacts too strict, 
this can create substantial harm to the financial institution under supervision. For example, the 
market can get a wrong signal, with a loss of credibility as a consequence. It will often (but of 
course not always) be better to follow a more lenient strategy, but of course in some situations 
this can backfire, and without immunity the financial supervisor could be held liable for the 
damages, which can be enormous.
88
  Without immunity, financial supervisors would be often 
inclined to take too strict measures, at least if they won’t have to pay for the consequences of 
these measures.
89
 
 
III. Liability for Lawful Conduct 
A. Principles and B. Justifications 
As the questionnaire makes clear conduct should be considered lawful if it complies with all 
relevant legislative requirements and is pursued with reasonable care even if it in fact causes 
harm. If liability were to be found in this particular case it would amount to a strict liability of 
the public authority. As De Geest (2011) shows, for multi-task agents (like public authorities) 
strict liability leads to overprecaution. The reason is that strict liability for harm internalises 
the harm, but not the precaution costs which are externalised by a multi-task agent.
90
 From an 
economic perspective, this is a serious economic disadvantage of imposing strict liability on 
public authorities.  
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Next, one could argue that a public authority is a superior risk bearer compared to most 
victims. However, the fact that private insurance is usually available may significantly 
weaken this argument.
91
 Furthermore, it has been stressed in the literature that public 
authority liability as a compensation mechanism may be far too costly given high litigation 
costs of the tort system. If compensation is the goal to be achieved, this can better be realised 
via alternatives such as (state provided) insurance or a public compensation mechanism. The 
transaction costs of those mechanisms may be lower than a costly liability system for lawful 
conduct.
92
 
 
IV. Conclusions 
In those cases in which tort law has a deterrent effect, public authority liability can be 
efficient. The chilling effect of liability may necessitate some exceptions, but these exceptions 
should not go further than necessary to prevent this effect. A partial immunity, one that makes 
allowance for ordinary negligence, may be desirable. However, the chilling argument does not 
apply to bad faith behavior or gross negligence. Also, the case for immunity will be weaker 
when chilling behavior can be easily detected and sanctioned. Also, discretionary duties 
should not always be immune for tort liability. When an official (or agency…) makes a policy 
choice that no reasonable person would ever make, there should be no immunity. 
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